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Charismatic Authority and Leadership Change: 
Lessons from Cuba’s Post-Fidel Succession
Bert Hoffmann
Abstract. When Max Weber introduced the concept of “charismatic 
authority” into the social sciences, acknowledging its great transformative 
potential, he stressed its inherent problem of succession. This proposition 
has been tested in the case of one of the most emblematic charismatic 
leaders in modern politics, Cuba’s longtime revolutionary leader Fidel 
Castro. When he fell ill in 2006, conventional wisdom assumed a major 
crisis of succession to be inevitable. So how was it possible that the 
Cuban regime was able to stage a gradual and orderly succession? In 
addressing this question, the article identifi es four key ways in which 
the empirical experience of the post-Fidel succession challenges our 
theoretical understanding of the link between charismatic authority 
and political leadership change.
Keywords: • Political succession • Charismatic authority • Leadership 
change • Max Weber • Cuba
Introduction
The question of succession in the highest political offi ce is one of the key prob-
lems any polity has to resolve. In this, the type of authority and leadership is a 
critical factor. While in modern political democracies constitutional provisions, 
time limits on mandates, and competitive elections are in place to resolve the 
succession in a state’s highest political offi ce, things are different in nonpluralist 
political orders. The less these are defi ned by traditional or bureaucratic-rational 
norms and institutions, the thornier the issue of succession tends to be. So when 
Max Weber introduced the concept of “charismatic authority” into the social 
sciences,1  he underscored the great revolutionary power it can have; but at 
the same time he pointed to the inevitable problem of succession inherent in 
charismatic leadership (Weber, 1968: 55f.).
Few would question that the almost half-a-century-long tenure of the leader 
of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro, was one of the most emblematic cases 
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of charismatic leadership in modern politics. It certainly proved the potential 
for revolutionary transformation that Weber ascribed to charismatic leaders, as 
“Castro led as complete a revolution as ever took place in Europe” (Horowitz, 
1968: 60). However, this article is about the second element: the question of 
succession, which became imminent when, in July of 2006, Fidel Castro’s health 
faltered and he had to cede his leadership position.
According to the Weberian insights on charismatic authority, a major succes-
sion crisis was to be expected. Indeed, with the demise of Cuba’s socialist allies 
overseas at the beginning of the 1990s many scholars had linked the country’s 
regime survival to the physical presence of its leader, as, for instance, Domínguez 
(1997: 10), who wrote: “The current political regime depends to such an extent on 
the person of Fidel Castro that its future is now perhaps more than ever identifi ed 
with his biological survival.” However, the Cuban regime has been able to stage a 
prolonged, gradual, and, by all comparative standards, smooth succession so far. 
It has avoided social unrest as well as visceral confrontations within the ruling 
elite. We have come to witness what after almost half a century of uninterrupted 
leadership had seemed an improbable scenario: a peaceful succession still within 
the lifetime of the charismatic leader.
When Max Weber (1968: 55f.) pointed to the problem of succession inherent 
in charismatic leadership, he sketched a spectrum of possible types of solutions at 
the moment of the leader’s demise. While some are essentially limited to religious 
movements (for example, revelation by oracles), for contemporary politics four 
of these options come into play: the designation of his own successor by the 
original charismatic leader; the conception that charisma is a quality transmitted 
by heredity, particularly to the leader’s closest relatives; the transmission by 
ritual means; and the designation of a successor by the charismatically qualifi ed 
administrative staff – a process, as Weber stresses, not to be interpreted as a mod-
ern “election” (Weber, 1968: 55) but one with blurred lines in relation to insti-
tutionalized forms of transfer of power. How did these propositions play out in 
the case of Cuba’s post-Fidel succession? What solutions did the regime choose to 
ensure its survival in the face of the demise of its historic leader? What role was 
given to the institutions of state-socialism – the tangible materialization of what 
Weber had called the indispensable “routinization of charisma”?
Theory on leadership succession holds yet another proposition that the case 
under scrutiny challenges: the “succession dilemma” as formulated by Burling 
(1974), according to which a clear designation of the successor results in weak 
leadership, and a lack of clarity results in destructive power struggles. How, then, 
can we explain the Cuban case, where Raúl Castro has been the leader’s “second-
in-command” and designated successor for decades?
Finally, theories of political succession tend to be marked by a “methodological 
nationalism” which says little about the incongruence between, on the one hand, 
the international charismatic appeal of a leader such as Fidel Castro who has been 
a major actor on the world stage and, on the other hand, the political regime he 
led, which is confi ned to the limits of the Cuban nation-state. What are the impli-
cations of such a two-level leadership role at the moment of succession?
When studying third world countries, scholars of comparative politics have 
traditionally paid more attention to the issues of regime change than to the topic 
of leadership succession within a given system (Goeva and Holm, 1998: 131). 
Regarding Latin America, in the 1980s and 1990s the analysis of “transitions from 
authoritarian rule” (O’Donnell et al., 1986) and the prospects for democratization 
 at Leibniz Inst Globale und Regionale Studien on January 13, 2014ips.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
 Hoffmann: Charismatic Authority and Leadership Change 231
became a dominant strand in political science research. Within this literature, the 
Cuban regime was largely neglected until 1989, as it did not fall into the typical 
patterns of the “bureaucratic-authoritarian state” elsewhere on the continent and 
there was no major expectation of regime change as long as the island’s ties with 
the Soviet Union remained in place. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
Cuba’s subsequent economic crisis, the issue of regime change and democratization 
became the object of a great deal of scholarly literature. This literature, however, 
remained largely prospective or prescriptive, while on the island political continuity 
prevailed against considerable odds (Hoffmann, 2001).
It is not the interest of this article to add to the speculative “Cuba after Fidel” 
scenarios that have been an evergreen in the scholarly literature on Cuba in the 
past.2  Instead, it sets out to empirically examine, Weber’s conceptual toolbox in 
hand, how the demise and succession of Cuba’s charismatic leader were played 
out in Cuban politics, and how this feeds back on our theoretical and conceptual 
understanding. Hence, rather than “transition to democracy,” the object of this 
study is the “transition from charismatic authority.” In this sense, the aim of 
this article is to contribute to what the author considers to be very much a still-
pending task: to insert the empirical case of the post-Fidel succession into the 
broader theoretical and comparative debate about charismatic authority and 
leadership change.
The article unfolds as follows. The section following this introduction will review 
some of the key concepts of the debate on charisma and political succession; 
against this background, it will refl ect on the nature of Cuba’s political regime 
under Fidel Castro’s leadership. The article will then turn to an empirical analy-
sis of the post-Fidel succession, which, while not designed as a comparative study, 
will draw on other succession experiences to explore commonalities and differ-
ences. In doing so, it will highlight four important ways in which the case of 
Cuba’s post-Fidel succession challenges conventional wisdom about the link 
between charismatic authority and political leadership change: the role and 
character of the regime’s “second-in-command” (third section); the interplay 
between charisma and institutionalization (fourth section); the implications 
of the gradualist model of succession, which includes a complex power-sharing 
arrangement as the outgoing leader maintains an important role as the legitimator 
of the successor government (fi fth section); and fi nally, the twofold nature of 
the post-Fidel leadership succession: the handover of power to a bureaucratic-
institutionalized successor in the realm of the Cuban nation-state, and a theatrically 
staged transfer of charisma by ritual means to an heir beyond the nation’s borders. 
The conclusion then refl ects on the lessons that the empirical analysis of the post-
Fidel succession contributes to the general research on charismatic authority and 
leadership succession in contemporary politics.
Before we continue, a brief note on data collection is due. The author has visited 
Cuba for fi eld trips about a dozen times, both before and after Fidel fell ill. During 
these visits he spoke at length with Cubans working in the state apparatus as well 
as with political opponents, intellectuals, and “ordinary citizens.” However, it is 
a deliberate choice not to empirically base this article on individual interviews. 
As the political process at the upper echelons of power is solidly shielded from 
public view, any interview partner, no matter how “high up” he or she may be, can 
only present more or less plausible interpretations of a political reality played out 
behind the scenes, with no possibility of independent verifi cation or falsifi cation. 
As a result, speculation becomes inevitable.
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Instead, the present article’s empirical analysis is essentially based on speeches 
and documents published in Cuba’s offi cial media. In the absence of pluralist 
political competition and its corollary institutions, the state media are more than 
just channels through which the Cuban authorities communicate their views to 
the population; rather, they constitute the principal way Cuban politics as such 
are made public. Their political bias and shortcomings are all too obvious. Yet, 
as the politics behind the scenes are kept as state secrets, it is these offi cial mani-
festations in the media which represent the visible face of Cuban politics and 
hence become the key points of reference for political actors as much as for 
academic observers.
The owl of Minerva takes fl ight at dusk, Hegel once postulated. But the analy-
sis of recent political events, such as Cuba’s post-Fidel succession, cannot be put 
off until some day when we perhaps have access to empirical data on what went 
on behind the closed doors, to recordings of talks between Fidel and Raúl, or 
to transcripts of the Politburo discussions. Albeit with manifold limitations, we 
have a signifi cant body of publicly available evidence to analyze, without falling 
victim to speculative “Kremlin astrology.” Moreover, this article has no ambition 
to be conclusive on the issue; Minerva’s owl will have many more turns to take in 
Cuban skies.
The Nature of the Beast: A Case of “Charismatic State Socialism”
Charisma is a concept which, as Turner (2003: 5) writes, “arose from theological 
obscurity through social science, from which it passed into popular culture.” As 
“charisma” has now become a buzzword used ubiquitously in media, marketing, and 
politics, we need to rewind to Max Weber’s seminal work, in which he developed 
the categories and typologies of charismatic authority that have become stand-
ard items in the theorization of leadership and succession in politics. For Weber, 
charismatic authority is one of three types of legitimate authority, alongside 
bureaucratic-rational and traditional authority. He defi nes it as “resting on devotion 
to the specifi c and exceptional sanctity, heroism or exemplary character of an 
individual person, and of normative patterns revealed or ordained by him” (Weber, 
1968: 46). The charismatic leader “is set apart from ordinary men and treated 
as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifi cally exceptional 
powers or qualities” (Weber, 1968: 48).
As noted earlier, Max Weber foresaw a crisis of succession at the moment of 
the charismatic leader’s demise and sketched a spectrum of possible types of solu-
tions. Before we contrast these Weberian succession scenarios with the empirical 
reality of the Cuban case, we need to answer whether – and if so, to what extent – 
the case under scrutiny is adequately approached with the concept of charismatic 
leadership.
Ever since Weber, an important strand of scholarly literature has understood 
charisma essentially as the personality traits or personal attributes of the leader. 
This was underscored when, in the 1970s, organizational research and manage-
ment studies on leadership began to take a lead role in the academic use and 
defi nition of charisma3  – which placed crucial emphasis on the personality, 
behavior, and psychology of the leader. As this infl uenced the interpretation 
of charisma in other social sciences, it frequently led to “a bias towards heroic 
conceptions of leadership” (Yukl, 1999) and even as far as futile genius debates 
(e.g. Simonton, 1984).
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However, unlike physical characteristics, a leader’s charisma can never be a 
mere personal quality, for it only comes into existence in interaction with his 
audience. Weber himself makes it suffi ciently clear that charisma must, by def-
inition, be understood not as a personal but rather as a relational category: “It 
is recognition on the part of those subject to authority which is decisive for the 
validity of charisma” (Weber, 1968: 49).
Countering the leader-centric perspective, Madsen and Snow (1996), in their 
analysis of the Peronist experience in Argentina, shift the focus of attention to “the 
charismatic bond,” that is, the relational property of charisma. They and others 
have underscored that charisma depends on the material conditions, interests, 
and expectations of those the leader appeals to. In this sense, Jones, for instance, 
stressed that follower response depends upon the leader’s providing an answer 
to a situational need (Jones, 2001: 763). Similarly, Beyer (1999) argues that, 
in the study of charismatic leadership, the contextual factors need to move from 
the periphery to the center of the research agenda. She goes as far as defi ning 
“charisma” as a “social structure” (Beyer, 1999: 309).
Eisenstadt (1968: xxviii), whose reading of Weber was critical in inserting the 
latter’s concepts in modernization theory, had already pointed to the import-
ance of “communicative situations” which facilitate charismatic relations. The 
“communicative situation” par excellence is a moment of crisis that precipitates 
the emergence of a leader with a radical vision of systemic change. When the 
existing order is shattered, societies are more ready to respond to people who are – 
as Fidel Castro was in postrevolutionary Cuba – able to endow them with new 
meanings, new symbols, and new orientations regarding the new rules, all of 
which make it possible “to relate the individual to collective identifi cation, and 
to reassure him of his status and his place in a given collectivity” (Eisenstadt, 
1968: xxviii).
In the research on the Cuban Revolution and its leader, these competing 
understandings of “charisma” fi nd ample refl ection. Numerous scholars from 
different backgrounds have emphasized the charismatic character of Fidel 
Castro’s personality: the heroic example and extraordinary qualities displayed 
in the guerrilla war and as the military “commander-in-chief” of the revolution; 
his profound sense of mission and his leadership by example; his oratorical skills 
and emotional appeal in his communication to the people; his personalist style 
of leadership, and so forth. The list of such traits attributed to Fidel Castro is 
long, as would be the list of authors who have based the claim of Fidel’s charisma 
on these traits.4
However, there is also an important strand of authors in Cuban studies (e.g. 
Domínguez, 1978; Eckstein, 1994; Fagen, 1965; Valdés, 2001) who have indeed 
understood Fidel’s charismatic authority as a relational category, and who have 
consequently paid more attention to the opportunity structures in which he 
acted. Fidel’s charismatic appeal was due not only to his fl amboyant rhetoric on 
the Plaza but also to the redistributive measures his government enacted, which 
to many Cubans proved the credibility of his commitment to radically break with 
a past associated with corruption and social exclusion. Similarly, the primacy of 
personal loyalty over ideological defi nition (as embodied in the slogan of the 
early 1960s that read “Si Fidel es comunista, que me pongan en la lista!” – “If 
Fidel is a communist, then sign me up, too!”) refl ects less the personality of the 
leader than the popular response to his calls.
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Such an understanding connects with Max Weber’s highlighting of charisma 
as “the greatest revolutionary force” (Weber, 1968: 53): the leader’s charisma 
stems precisely from his embodiment of a radical, revolutionary break with the 
past, in such a form that popular hopes view it as a remedy to their problems. 
Seen from this perspective, the leader, despite his extraordinary status, appears 
as much a product of circumstances as the motor of their change.
As charismatic leadership is not based on bureaucratic norms or traditions, the 
leader’s claim to leadership is inherently at odds with the notion of a time-limited 
mandate. “The charismatic leader,” Robert Michels wrote, “does not abdicate, not 
even when the water reaches to his throat. Precisely in his readiness to die lies one 
element of his force and his triumph.”5  Turner (2003: 7) exemplifi es this trait of 
leadership with quotations from Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. While this 
is illustrative, Chávez’s rhetoric seems only to echo the slogan of “Socialismo o 
Muerte” coined earlier by Fidel Castro. In fact, the Numantian attitude of pre-
ferring death to surrender has been a hallmark of Fidel’s tenure. It is all the more 
noteworthy that his long rule eventually came to an end that, while sparked by 
illness, did not follow any of the dramatic prescriptions of Michels.
Finally, as the Greek term “charisma” translates as “gift of grace” or “divine grace,” 
Weber’s concept has been endowed with strong religious overtones. When applied 
to the study of modern political leaders, this leads to a “blind alley” (Madsen and 
Snow, 1996: 1) if charisma is not understood in a secularized manner. In the case 
of Fidel’s recourse to legitimacy through a higher authority, “history” took the 
place of the Divine, as emblematically spelled out in his 1953 trial defense, which 
terminated with his famous statement: “History will absolve me!” But even in 
Cuba’s revolutionary and nominally atheist state, popular religiosity remained an 
important element in the social construction of the leader’s charisma, as Valdés 
(2001) has argued.6
While this article so far has emphasized the charismatic aspects of Fidel Castro’s 
rule, it is important to remember that Weberian ideal types are not to be mistaken 
for empirical cases. The German sociologist noted that over time the routinization 
of charisma is inevitable if charismatic authority is not to be a purely transitory 
phenomenon: “Indeed, in its pure form charismatic authority may be said to exist 
only in the process of originating. It cannot remain stable, but becomes either 
traditionalized or rationalized, or a combination of both” (Weber, 1968: 54). 
Cuba under Fidel is a case that illustrates well how the charismatic dimension so 
all-dominant in the beginning becomes over time one element that coexists and 
combines with others to legitimize political rule.
Hence, if the conceptual framework of charismatic leadership is helpful in 
explaining Cuban politics, it is so only to the degree that scholars are aware of its 
limitations and of the combination of charisma with other sources of power and 
legitimacy. For instance, Jorge Domínguez’s magnum opus on Cuba’s political 
order lists charisma as one of four elements in the legitimization of revolution-
ary rule, the others being political deliverance, distributional performance, 
and nationalism (Domínguez, 1978: 201). Susan Eckstein (1994) is particularly 
explicit in making the point that Fidel Castro, while being “in many respects a 
textbook case of a Weberian ideal-typical charismatic leader” (Eckstein, 1994: 20), 
“turned to traditional and especially to rational-legal bureaucratic forms of legit-
imation and authority as well” (Eckstein, 1994: 20).7  The central form of rational-
legal authority has been the core set of Soviet-style institutions, adopted in the 
1970s. However, Cuba never came to be just one more member of the family; 
the persistence of strong elements of charismatic leadership always set the Cuban 
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case apart from the bureaucratic state-socialist experiences of Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union.
To accommodate the coexistence of both the rational-legal order of social-
ism and its charismatic underpinnings, the regime led by Fidel Castro may be 
adequately understood as one of “charismatic state socialism.” For this type of 
regime, the moment of leadership succession should indeed mark a profound 
political challenge. The article will now turn to this question.
Escaping the Succession Dilemma: 
Cuba’s “Second-Man” Exceptionalism
In his outline of a theory of succession, Burling (1974: 260) formulated the general 
“succession dilemma” as follows: “When the successor is too clearly designated, 
weak leadership is often the result. When he is not designated clearly enough, 
the result may be a destructive succession struggle.” Burling (1974: 256) sees the 
underlying reason for this in the “second-in-command problem”; a man or an 
offi ce with an unambiguous second position is as rare as an unambiguous fi rst 
position is usual, he argues. This is so because anyone holding an undisputed sec-
ond position for a sustained period of time poses a potential threat to the man on 
top: “If a man occupies a clear second place, every opponent of the top man will 
tend to rally around him, and he will then become a serious rival to the man on top” 
(Burling, 1974: 256).
The other reason political leaders tend to refrain from designating a successor 
is that this may alienate important constituencies, as Brown (2005) has argued in 
his analysis of succession in Arab republics and monarchies. Keeping the question 
of succession open can be a vital instrument for integrating diverging political 
forces, as different groups or factions can hope that “their turn” is about to come 
as long as they remain in good standing with the incumbent.
The historical experience of state socialism shows that leaders typically shied 
away from having an individual in an undisputed second position over prolonged 
periods of time, both for fear of this individual evolving into a rival and owing to 
the integrational effect of keeping the question of succession open. A consequence 
was that succession often remained a highly confl ictive issue, as the power struggles 
on such occasions in the USSR and other state-socialist countries attest (Taras, 
1989). A textbook illustration of Burling’s thesis is the case of Mao Zedong, the 
other great charismatic leader of a third world revolution in the twentieth century 
at the helm of a Communist Party-based system. Mao never had an undisputed 
second-in-command for any long period of time, and his death was indeed fol-
lowed by the fi erce infi ghting of rival factions during the Cultural Revolution 
(e.g. Sandschneider, 1987).
The case of Fidel’s tenure has been crucially different in regard to this “second-
in-command problem.” Accounts vary as to when precisely Fidel declared his 
younger brother Raúl as his designated successor: Valdés (2004: 243) speaks of 
May 1 1960, in the face of assassination attempts on Fidel. Others, such as Thomas 
(1971: 1087), place the declaration even earlier, in the very fi rst days after the 
revolutionary takeover. Fidel’s “mando único” (unifi ed command) became repli-
cated in Raúl, who became his deputy in all formal offi ces.
The “Sovietization thesis” so prominent in the analysis of Cuba’s 1970s insti-
tutionalization process8  simply failed to acknowledge that in such a key aspect Cuba 
fundamentally departed from the Soviet mold, in which the top offi ces of party, 
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state, and military affairs, and certainly their deputy positions, typically were not 
united in one hand.9  The towering fi gure of Fidel led observers to overlook the 
importance of the role played by Raúl Castro: as the eternal and unquestionably 
loyal number two, he was a crucial part of Cuban exceptionalism; he immunized 
Fidel’s rule against the typical instabilities stemming from power struggles around 
the second-in-command position.
One option available to charismatic leaders in order to resolve the succession 
problem is, following Weber, the hereditary transmission of charisma. Such 
dynastic succession is usually from one generation to the other, but it can also 
be enacted among siblings. The most prominent case of dynastic succession in 
the communist experience of the twentieth century is the North Korean case, 
where, beginning in 1973, Kim Il Song systematically built up his son Kim Jong Il 
as his successor (Scobell, 2005). In public the Cuban leadership has been 
unambiguous in its rejection of any such dynastic line of succession, which in 
Central America and the Caribbean – take the case of “Papa Doc” and “Baby Doc” 
Duvalier in Haiti or the Somoza clan in Nicaragua – is identifi ed with the most 
reactionary dictatorships. According to offi cial discourse, Raúl was appointed to 
the second-man position solely based on the merits he earned in the insurgency 
movement before the triumph of the revolution and in his army, state, and party 
functions after 1959, and not because of his brotherly ties to Fidel.
However, things do not seem to be quite that easy. In experiences of insurgency, 
clandestine activity, and cadre politics that are shielded from public transparency, 
loyalty, trust, and confi dence are paramount preconditions of merit; they are 
the sine qua non for any individual to be given or to remain in a position of 
leadership (as the innumerable cases against defections and “traitors” attest). As 
this trust is vitally based on shared experiences, in which common identities evolve 
and loyalties are proven, it cannot surprise that this type of political endeavor is 
particularly prone to draw on the resources of kinship networks with their often 
strong codes of loyalty.10
Before undergoing emergency surgery in July 2006, Fidel handwrote a pro-
clamation (proclama) in which he delegated “in provisional form,” as was stressed, 
his functions at the head of the Cuban state, the armed forces, and the Com-
munist Party to his deputy in these functions, Raúl Castro. However, regarding 
the family ties between Fidel and Raúl, the Cuban leaders seem aware of the thin 
line they are walking. A year and a half later, and only two months before Raúl 
was to be formalized as Fidel’s defi nite successor, the ailing leader addressed the 
delegates of Cuba’s National Assembly, stating: “In the Proclamation I signed 
on 31 July 2006, none of you ever saw any act of nepotism”(F. Castro, 2007b). In 
the form of denial, this statement refl ects the worries on precisely that point. The 
leadership takes the voice of the delegates by speaking in their name (“none of 
you ever”), thus essentially banning the issue from permissible discourse.
In the post-Fidel succession, Raúl Castro’s long-standing role as “second man” 
has been crucially important. There is some irony in the fact that even Fidel 
seems to ignore the full dimension of this aspect. In the book-length interview 
with Ignacio Ramonet carried out shortly before he had to undergo surgery and 
delegate his powers, he was asked: “If you disappeared, for whatever circumstance – 
would Raúl be your undisputed substitute?” Fidel replied: “If something happens 
to me tomorrow, I am absolutely certain that the National Assembly will gather 
and elect him, without the slightest doubt. The Politburo will meet and elect 
him” (Ramonet, 2006: 563, author’s translation). None of this occurred. In the 
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summer of 2006 neither the National Assembly nor the Politburo came together. 
Nor did they have to. Article 94 of the Cuban Constitution stipulates: “In case of 
the absence, illness or death of the President of the Council of State, his duties 
will be assumed by the First Vice President” (República de Cuba, 1992, author’s 
translation). Hence, Raúl Castro was fully designated to take Fidel’s place as head 
of state; on rational-legal grounds there was no need for any proclama by Fidel 
or for any electoral act before the end of the term for which Fidel, and Raúl as 
his deputy, had been elected by the National Assembly in 2003.
It is the Weberian analysis of succession to charismatic authority which makes 
evident why the handwritten proclama was needed: it was the symbolic gesture 
that succession to leadership was not determined through the legal-institutional 
process (the deputy takes over) or through designation by the corresponding 
administrative staff (the National Assembly or Politburo) alone, but was rather 
enacted as “the designation on the part of the original charismatic leader of his 
own successor” (Weber, 1968: 54).
Raúl Castro is only four years younger than his brother and can, for age reasons 
alone, be seen as a transitional fi gure. When he formally assumed offi ce in 2008, 
he named 77-year-old party veteran Machado Ventura fi rst vice president. This 
choice marks the end of Cuba’s “second-man exceptionalism,” as Machado Ventura 
is regarded neither as unambiguous second man nor as designated successor. 
However successfully the regime has managed the post-Fidel succession, the ex-
perience in no way establishes a role model for future leadership changes. “There 
is no ‘equivalent Raúl’ for Raúl,” as Valdés (2004: 251) has put it.
Charisma, Succession, and Institutionalization: 
“Fidel is the Party, Raúl is the Party”
It seems all too plausible that for personalistic rule the question of leadership 
succession represents a greater challenge than for regimes with institutional 
one-party rule, as Burnell (2006: 552) argues. But what if Cuba’s “charismatic 
state socialism” has been a combination of both types? Charismatic leadership 
at fi rst seems sharply antithetical to bureaucratic authority, as it thrives on its 
role of being above the everyday administrative routine. At the same time, 
Weber noted that a “routinization of charisma” is indispensable, giving birth to 
new traditions and new institutions endowed with “charisma of offi ce,” if it is 
to prevail over time (Weber, 1968: 61). According to Eisenstadt, while charisma 
has a great transformative capacity and can be highly creative in the provision 
of new order and meaning, it is the routinization of charisma that transforms 
these innovations into a more continuous social organization and institutional 
framework (Eisentadt, 1968: xxi).
The relationship between the charismatic leader and the institutions he creates 
is typically laden with tensions. Fidel was no exception. The Partido Comunista 
de Cuba (PCC), contrary to the Leninist postulate of the Communist Party’s 
vanguard role, was founded in its present form only years after the triumph 
of the revolution. It was meant to spread Fidel’s charisma more by embodying 
moral principles and exemplary behavior than by functional efficiency or 
vanguard knowledge in the interpretation of the writings of Marx and Lenin 
(Domínguez, 1978: 337).11
With the “process of institutionalization” in the 1970s, the new Soviet-inspired 
constitution enshrined the Communist Party as the “leading force in state and 
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society” (República de Cuba, 1992). It was at this time that the Communist Party 
also became, for the fi rst time, an offi cial answer of sorts to the question of leader-
ship succession, as the slogan “Men die, but the Party is immortal!” was launched 
(Leogrande, 2002: 17).
Despite the adoption of Soviet-style institutions, the dualism of charismatic and 
legal-rational elements was still refl ected in Fidel Castro’s very titles. He acquired 
the titles of the state-socialist nomenclature, and offi cial declarations named him 
as First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Cuban Communist Party and 
President of the Council of Ministers and of the Council of State; yet his foremost 
title never ceased to be that of the Comandante en Jefe – a title found neither in 
the country’s constitution nor in the party’s statutes.
The last decade of Fidel’s tenure was particularly notable for a deinstitutional-
ization which affected both party and state (Domínguez, 1997: 12). Although the 
Communist Party’s statutes require it to hold a congress every fi ve years, after 
the 1997 congress Fidel never publicly mentioned the idea of calling the next one. 
More blatantly, deinstitutionalization was accompanied by a return to campaign-
style politics under the slogan of the “battle of ideas” (batalla de ideas). This approach 
combined mass mobilizations with the creation of new parallel structures which 
sidelined the formally established competencies of party and state organs. At its 
commanding heights were young cadres – “talibans,” as Cuban street jargon was 
quick to term them – whose authority was derived directly from Fidel.
A landmark decision in the re-personalization of Cuban politics was the des-
ignation of Felipe Pérez Roque as foreign minister in 1999. Aged 34 at the time, 
Pérez Roque had been the chief of staff of the Grupo de Apoyo al Comandante, 
Fidel’s personal support group. The offi cial announcement of Pérez Roque’s 
nomination explicitly underscored that his legitimacy for the post derived from 
his unmediated ties to Fidel, and stressed that he was “familiarized with the ideas 
and the thoughts of Fidel Castro as few others are” (Consejo de Estado, 1999).
It was Pérez Roque who – well before Fidel’s health problems became acute – in 
a programmatic address to the National Assembly in December 2005 underscored 
the charismatic character of Cuban socialism in order then to sketch a model of 
an explicitly charismatic rather than institutional succession (in which he was 
widely seen to be profi ling himself as the leader’s chosen crown prince). Pérez 
Roque defi ned the people’s blind faith in its leader as the revolution’s “greatest 
treasure”: “The way in which we understand this authority is as follows: ‘I don’t 
understand very well, but if Fidel said so, I am sure that this is how it is’” (Pérez 
Roque, 2005, author’s translation). And as if to paraphrase Weber’s defi nition of 
charismatic authority as resting on the exemplary character of the leader, Pérez 
Roque time and again invoked “the authority that comes from the example” (ibid.), 
going so far as to defi ne this as the essence of the regime’s ideology: “Socialism 
is the science of the example” (ibid.). The conclusion for the post-Fidel era was 
as uninstitutional as could be: “As long as this country has a leadership based on 
example ... it is invincible” (ibid.).
While the Cuban leadership publicly denies any internal differences, since Fidel 
fell ill Raúl Castro has led a model of succession that is diametrically opposed to 
the one suggested by Pérez Roque. While Weber had suggested the transmission of 
charisma by heredity, the brotherly bond between Fidel and Raúl was not used for 
a transfer of charisma. Ironically, whereas Pérez Roque, a young “apparatchik” of 
the regime, spoke out for a charismatic succession model, Raúl Castro emphatically 
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rejected this. Instead, he has missed no opportunity to discursively reposition the 
Communist Party as the center of Cuban politics.
While two contrasting approaches to the post-Fidel succession competed within 
the same single-party regime framework, elite cohesion has been suffi ciently 
strong not to let these differences escalate. Raúl Castro’s thesis that the answer 
to succession is institutionalization has carried the day. A provincial party paper, 
Guerrero, from the PCC’s Pinar del Río branch, summed up the offi cial take on the 
post-Fidel succession as follows: “Fidel is the Party, Raúl is the Party” (Guerrillero, 
August 3 2006).
A closer analysis of the political process, however, raises doubts about whether 
the Communist Party is really being given the lead role in Cuban politics, as 
offi cial rhetoric stresses. Under Raúl’s guidance the presence of army offi cers in 
the top state bodies has visibly increased; the long overdue party congress has 
been scheduled to take place in the second half of 2009; and, perhaps most 
tellingly, in April 2008 Raúl established a new supreme body within the party’s 
Politburo, a seven-person commission whose membership exactly mirrors the 
seven-member presidency of the Council of State named two months earlier. 
Thus, rather than being the “guiding force in state and society,” as Article 5 of the 
socialist constitution prescribes, the Communist Party follows the structures of 
the state apparatus. Institutionalization is undertaken in the name of the party, but 
in political practice its base is an amalgam of state, military, and party structures.
From Leader to Legitimator: “Cohabitation,” Cuban-style
If a charismatic leader dies or is ousted by force, succession will typically be an 
abrupt process, as the need to fi ll the vacuum at the top is imminent. The situation 
is different, however, when the reason for the disruption is illness or old age, as 
these often mark not a total but a relative incapacity to perform the leadership 
role. It is in these cases that succession can be a prolonged and gradual affair.
Cuba’s post-Fidel succession made a gala out of this gradualism. When the 
leader had to undergo emergency surgery in July 2006, he delegated his functions 
only “temporarily,” as was stressed. For more than a year and a half a climate of 
uncertainty was deliberately maintained regarding whether Fidel would eventually 
return to his former functions, until he fi nally ceded formal offi ce as head of 
state in February of 2008 when his brother Raúl was elected by the National 
Assembly to succeed him as President of the Council of State and of the Council 
of Ministers.12
A simplifi ed perception of succession focuses merely on who fi lls the highest 
offi ce left by the outgoing leader. However, the character and function of the 
highest offi ce itself can be subject to change in the process. This does not necessarily 
mean formal changes in its constitutional defi nition, but can also apply to the 
de facto nature of the top leadership position. As Calvert points out, drawing 
on truly dissimilar cases, the offi ce of the prime minister in Great Britain had 
no legal standing until 1904; Libya’s Gaddafi  does not hold any constitutionally 
formalized position; and in socialist states such as the Soviet Union or China the 
question of what constitutes the highest offi ce itself has been repeatedly disputed 
(Calvert, 1987: 3–4).
While Raúl Castro held the deputy position to Fidel Castro in all offi ces, this 
statement needs one important qualifi cation: it refers to all formal offi ces in the 
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party, state, and military, but not to that title which most clearly embodies the 
charismatic side of Fidel’s tenure, that of Comandante en Jefe (commander-
in-chief) of the Cuban Revolution. There was never any such position as “Deputy 
Comandante en Jefe.” In the succession, Raúl emblematically bid farewell to 
the Fidelista leadership model when he declared that neither he nor any other 
successor was to take on the title of “Comandante en Jefe.”13
Raúl Castro’s own leadership style is as uncharismatic as can be – a point he 
himself has publicly underscored.14 This goes hand in hand with a turn to more 
collective leadership, in which Raúl Castro is a primus inter pares rather than a 
towering leader. Factions have been offi cially banned from Cuban politics since 
the 1960s (Domínguez, 1989), but intra-party competition and rivalries have per-
sisted to some degree. While the quest for elite cohesion, collective leadership, and 
factional power-sharing within a state-socialist party apparatus is a pattern known 
from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, or China (Breslauer, 1989; Taras, 1989), 
the Cuban experience of gradual succession within the lifetime of the leader was 
unique in that it also implied complex power-sharing arrangements between the 
outgoing and the incoming leader.
The role played by Fidel Castro since July 2006 has not only been a dependent 
variable of his state of health but also refl ects a political arrangement within 
the political leadership. As early as three months after Fidel’s surgery, the party 
newspaper cautiously hinted that Fidel – rather than preparing to come back to 
the supreme political role previously held – would be pursuing “special tasks” 
(Bonasso, 2006). The visible forms these special tasks have taken are the so-called 
“Refl exiones,” opinion pieces written by Fidel Castro in the party newspaper Granma.15 
In the streets of Havana, commentators have quipped about this change of function 
that Fidel has now become “Comentarista en Jefe” (commentator-in-chief).
An analysis of Fidel’s “Refl exiones” shows that they are concerned with, essentially, 
a) international politics, most prominently US politics, the EU, and the Bolivarian 
Revolution led by Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, but also the perspectives of other 
left-wing Latin American leaders; b) issues of global concern facing humanity, 
such as climate change and food shortages; and c) historical accounts of the 
Cuban Revolution’s epic struggles. It is crucial to note what Fidel’s commentaries 
do not address: we hardly fi nd any mention of domestic policy issues beyond very 
general statements. While the degree of voluntariness and coercion involved in 
this “cohabitation” arrangement is open to speculation, Fidel Castro publicly 
ratifi ed his new role when he stated his need to 
“refl ect at length [on] how immensely the world has changed in the past 60 
years ... I devote time to this ... Now that I am dedicated to this task ... I feel 
I have more energy, more strength and more time to devote to study. I have 
once again become a student” asking “for tranquility for me to be able to fulfi ll 
my new tasks” (F. Castro, 2007c).
Fidel’s “new tasks” bring to mind the “second-front” concept once put forward 
by Mao Zedong, as the aging Chinese leader tried to prepare his succession: 
“I was in the second front while other comrades were in the fi rst front ... Since 
I was in the second front, I did not take charge of daily work. Many things were 
done by others and their prestige was thus cultivated, so that when I met with 
God, the State would not be thrown into great convulsions.”16 
With hindsight we know that this was insuffi cient to prevent the Chinese 
state from “great convulsions” after Mao’s death. The problem was not a lack of 
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“prestige” or capacity on the part of others, but rather the fi erce rivalry among 
them about who was to succeed the Great Chairman and what policy course was 
to be taken.17
In Cuba, however, a “second-front” strategy has been played out in a different 
context, as the successor has been named and taken offi ce during the lifetime of 
the historical leader. Gradual succession has taken place through a power-sharing 
arrangement, which for a signifi cant amount of time conceals how much or how 
little power rests with either of the actors involved. Even three years after Fidel’s 
proclamation, while there is little doubt that Raúl has consolidated his power 
in the apparatus (Oxford Analytica, 2008), he has put brakes on his own initial 
reform proposals that included policy changes long disdained by his brother. 
The Raúl government, while it shies away from striving for a charismatic ap-
proach of its own, remains critically dependent on recourse to the charismatic 
leader for legitimacy. This may be surprising, as Raúl Castro is fully legitimated 
by the regime’s bureaucratic-legal order, and he was unmistakably designated by 
the charismatic leader, fi rst in Fidel’s proclama of 2006 and again in a written 
endorsement to the National Assembly when it elected Raúl as formal head 
of state in 2008. Yet the Cuban case shows that the transfer of legitimacy from 
charismatic authority is not a one-time affair as the Weberian notion of “designation 
by the charismatic leader” suggests. Such designation may be a necessary, but 
not necessarily a suffi cient, condition. As the charismatic leader becomes the 
legitimator, the successor government needs to continually validate its actions 
through recourse to his legacy.
Even where the successors depart from previous policies, they seek legitimacy 
for this through recourse to the former leader: “Revolution means changing every-
thing that needs to be changed” is the Fidel quotation that was ordered to be 
painted on billboards all across the country. While in the case of defunct leaders 
such a strategy of discursive appropriation depends solely on the power to inter-
pret the leader’s legacy, in a succession during the leader’s lifetime it includes 
either the leader’s acquiescence or his inability to disown the interpreters. It has 
been precisely the ability to work out and enforce this power-sharing arrange-
ment between the outgoing leader and his successor that has so far enabled the 
smoothness of the post-Fidel succession, but which also accounts for a lack of 
coherence and dynamism in government policies.
Charisma beyond the Nation-State: Fidel’s Transnational Heir
The issue of political succession of heads of state is normally analyzed within the 
framework of the nation-state. However, as a strong sense of mission is typical of 
charismatic leadership, the latter’s appeal can go well beyond its domestic con-
stituency, if the mission’s goals and values are not defi ned in terms that are too 
nationalistic. In this sense, charismatic leadership is a broader category than ruler-
ship of a specifi c polity. A leader can have a following beyond the nation-state’s 
borders which is not bound by formal aspects such as citizenship or eligibility 
to vote.
The case of Fidel Castro highlights how relevant such transnational charis-
matic appeal can be for the question of succession. Fidel was, for one, the leader of 
the Cuban state. Beyond this, however, his “mission” of anti-imperialist revolution 
and third world emancipation had global appeal. Particularly for Latin America’s 
left, this secured Fidel a transnational following across the continent. In the suc-
cession these two levels of leadership were divided into a domestic side, in which 
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the highest offi ce in the Cuban state was passed on to Raúl, and a less tangible 
transnational side, in which Fidel’s charisma was transferred to the Venezuelan 
president and leader of the so-called “Bolivarian Revolution,” Hugo Chávez.
Cuban–Venezuelan relations have a strong economic underpinning. While 
Venezuela is providing Cuba with oil on highly preferential terms, the Chávez 
government has been paid through Cuba’s exports of professionals and services 
in health, education, sports, and other sectors. Politically, while certainly Chávez 
has charismatic qualities of his own,18 his connection to Cuba has also allowed him 
to tap into Fidel’s charisma. He has been able to acquire considerable symbolic 
capital as the two revolutionary leaders have displayed a bond not merely of 
friendship or of political alliance, but of an intimate father–son relationship.19
The designation of Chávez as the extra-territorial heir of Fidel’s continental 
leadership role culminated in Chávez’s absolutely central role at the side of Fidel’s 
hospital bed after his operation of July 2006, as it was staged by Cuba’s state-
controlled media. All of the fi rst offi cial hospital footage showed the Venezuelan 
leader, not Raúl Castro or any other Cuban functionary, next to Fidel. Displaying 
a mastery of political theatrics, in Weberian terminology these hospital-bed 
scenes can be seen as the transmission of charisma “by ritual means,” in which 
Fidel Castro symbolically passed the torch of Latin American revolution to Hugo 
Chávez. As in the case of Raúl in domestic politics, here too the “designation on 
the part of the original charismatic leader of his own successor” (Weber, 1968: 55) 
is evident. The father–son imagery adds an element of elective familial lineage 
which contrasts with the negation of any relevance of Raúl’s real familial ties in 
the domestic succession.
If Chávez wants to convey to his followers that they are part of an epic histor-
ical project of liberation, no one may testify to the validity of this claim better 
than Fidel Castro. On the other hand, if the Raúl-led government feels the need 
to reinstitutionalize Cuba’s political system and to foster pragmatism and bur-
eaucratic rationality in the country’s economy and planning, it seems a gift from 
heaven to have someone else taking it on his shoulders to continue Fidel’s grand 
“internationalist” mission.
The transfer of the leader’s charisma to an heir beyond the borders of his own 
polity is an aspect foreseen neither by Weber nor in the more recent literature. Yet 
it proves to be an important element which fosters the viability of a domestic pol-
itical succession that opts to discontinue the charismatic leadership approach and 
to underscore institutionalization and bureaucratic-rational legitimacy instead.
Conclusions
The scenario we have witnessed in Cuba since July 2006 is something few observers, 
both on and off the island, had thought likely to occur after almost half a century 
of Fidel Castro’s highly personalist leadership: the political succession within the 
lifetime of the charismatic leader. As of now, this succession has proven much 
less disruptive or cataclysmic than many expected. Indeed, the present article 
has shown how the regime managed to stage the transfer of power from Fidel to 
Raúl, and from a political model of “charismatic state socialism” to a much more 
institutions-based model of “bureaucratic state socialism.”
However, a caveat is necessary. This analysis is about a process still in the mak-
ing. A successfully completed formal succession neither predicts that the role 
given to the outgoing leader will stand the test of time nor does it guarantee the 
sustained rule of the successor. In the short run, the successor government can 
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claim legitimacy based on the formal succession; in the medium term, however, 
it will have to seek new sources of support and legitimacy of its own. Economic 
performance will be crucial, and Raúl’s calls for economic reforms – however 
limited their implementation has been so far – seem to signal that the new 
leadership is very much aware of this.
Cuba’s post-Fidel succession challenges conventional wisdom on the succes-
sion dilemma deemed inherent in charismatic leadership on a number of counts. 
First, the Cuban case highlights potential antidotes to the “second-man” problem 
that Burling (1974) failed to identify when he formulated his general “succession 
dilemma.” The historical trajectory of the relationship between Fidel and Raúl 
Castro certainly is exceptional, and as such hardly represents a replicable model. 
However, it provides strong evidence that the loyalty networks included in family 
relations can be a vital resource for political leaders to draw upon, both during 
their tenure and in resolving the issue of succession. This does not have to take 
the form of a transfer of charisma by heredity, as envisaged by Weber, but also can 
hold in the case of a turn to institutionalization and rational-legal authority.
Second, as Weber had noted, over time charismatic authority must combine with 
traditionalized or rationalized forms of authority in order to persist (Weber, 1968: 
54). The case studied in this article shows how the precise nature of this combination 
is a crucial variable – and one that is often insuffi ciently explored in leader-centric 
studies on charismatic authority – in understanding the dynamics of succession. 
The empirical study underscores the hybrid nature of the political regime under 
Fidel Castro, which can be adequately captured by its characterization as “charis-
matic state socialism.” It was precisely the combination of charismatic leader-
ship with bureaucratic-rational authority, in the form of one-party state socialism 
with strong army participation, which gave the successor government suffi ciently 
strong alternative power structures to turn to as it discontinued the charismatic 
leadership style.
Third, the analysis of the post-Fidel succession has shown how the outgoing 
leader has maintained limited but continuous participation in the political 
arena; this challenges the notion implicit in the Weberian categories which sees 
succession as a one-time affair. As the outgoing leader has become detached 
from day-to-day political decision-making power, he has remained important 
as a legitimator to whom the successor government continuously needs to pay 
attention. By underscoring these aspects, the empirical case emphasizes the need 
to focus on a longer time frame, on the possibilities and implications of gradualist 
models of succession, and on the power-sharing arrangements between outgoing 
and incoming leadership, aspects which so far have been marginal in the study 
of charismatic authority.
Fourth and fi nally, this study highlights the potential defi cits of “methodological 
nationalism” inherent in common approaches to succession, in the case of charis-
matic leaders whose sense of mission is typically not bound to specifi c nation-state 
interests. The emergence of radical projects of transformation in Latin America, 
particularly the leadership of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, has led to the renewal 
of a “communicative situation” (Eisenstadt) for Fidel’s charismatic appeal beyond 
Cuba’s borders. This has facilitated a two-level succession: the succession to 
political rulership at the helm of the Cuban government and, detached from 
this, the transfer of charisma in regard to Fidel’s “internationalist” leadership role 
in the mission of anti-imperialist revolution and Latin American emancipation. 
As the latter has been symbolically delegated to an heir outside the Cuban 
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nation-state, it has contributed to the viability of a domestic succession that has 
emphasized rational-bureaucratic authority and bid farewell to the model of cha-
rismatic leadership.
While transnationalism has become a forceful paradigm in other research 
areas, there is still much work to be done with regard to cross-border political 
leadership roles. Cuba’s unique contribution to the study of “transitions from 
charismatic authority” may be to show how succession to a charismatic leader can 
be played out in transnational terms in a way that greatly reduces the tensions 
between the transformative power of charismatic authority and the stabilizing 
function of institutionalized rule.
Notes
 1. See Max Weber’s essay on “The Pure Types of Legitimate Authority,” originally pub-
lished in his Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft in 1922 (published in English as Theory of Social 
and Economic Organization); all citations in the following are taken from Weber (1968), 
particularly pp. 46–65. For a discussion of the Weberian term “Herrschaft” and its 
English translation as authority, see Adair-Toteff (2005: 191–2).
 2. An illustration is the case of Edward González (1976), who more than three decades 
ago argued that “the fact that Castro is now entering middle age (he will be fi fty later 
this year) reminds us that Cuba may someday confront a succession problem” and 
then went on to sketch different scenarios of succession.
 3. For example in the so-called “Neo-charismatic Leadership Paradigm” advanced in organ-
izational research since the 1970s by House (1977), Burns (1978), and Conger (1993).
 4. A classic exponent is González (1976).
 5. Cited in Turner (2003: 7).
 6. According to Valdés (2001), in Cuba’s popular syncretistic Santería religion Fidel came 
to be seen as “the chosen one” when, during a speech on January 8 1959, a white dove 
landed on his shoulders. This was interpreted as a sign from Obatalá, one of the import-
ant Santos of the Santería religion, that Castro had the blessing of the gods.
 7. We may add that to some degree he also did so before the triumph of the revolution. 
With respect to legal authority, one of the political banners of his 26th of July Movement 
was the reinstitution of the 1940 constitution that Batista had dispensed with. Another 
important recourse was to traditional authority: the identifi cation of the revolution 
as the culmination of Cuba’s century-old struggles for independence.
 8. For example González (1976); for a critique see Bengelsdorf (1988).
 9. As Breslauer points out, in the post-Stalin USSR “norms have developed against 
excessive power concentration by the general secretary, as refl ected in a written but 
secret rule against the same person occupying the post of CPSU general secretary and 
chairman of the Council of Ministers” (Breslauer, 1989: 35).
10. There are parallels with the case of the Ortega brothers’ role in the 1979 Sandinista 
Revolution in Nicaragua. However, their case does not replicate the immobile hierarchy 
between Fidel and Raúl Castro. Whereas Daniel Ortega is the older brother, it was 
Humberto who assumed what, after the triumph of 1979, was seen as the key position 
of power, command over the armed forces; Daniel Ortega’s participation in the fi ve-
person government junta seemed of lesser weight. It was only with political evolution 
and, in particular, with the presidential elections of 1984 that Daniel Ortega’s role 
began to outweigh that of his brother (Rediske, 1984).
11. In a memorable essay, Hans Magnus Enzensberger summed up in 1969 the tension 
between Fidel and Cuba’s Communist Party: “With great tenacity Fidel escapes the 
avant-garde that he conjured up. It will never catch up with him. He wants it and he 
does not want it. Fidel’s dilemma is also that of the PCC, an institution that has now 
been in the process of being built and destroyed for many years” (Enzensberger, 1969: 
215, author’s translation).
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12. The formal succession of Raúl as head of the Communist Party will presumably be 
left to the party congress planned for the second half of 2009.
13. “The Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban Revolution is one and only one” – meaning: 
Fidel – “and only the Communist Party ... can be the dignifi ed heir of the trust deposited 
by the people in its leader,” said Raúl Castro in his address to the 5th Plenary Meeting 
of the Cuban Communist Party’s Central Committee (in Granma, July 1 2006).
14. Raúl Castro, in his fi rst and programmatic Granma interview after assuming offi ce, 
included the following: “As a point of fact, I am not used to making frequent appearances 
in public, except at times when it is required ... Moreover, I have always been discreet, 
that is my way, and in passing I will clarify that I am thinking of continuing in that 
way. But that has not been the fundamental reason why I don’t appear very often in 
the mass media; simply, it has not been necessary” (R. Castro, 2006b).
15. All of these are accessible at the party newspaper’s website: http://www.granma.
cubaweb.cu/secciones/ref-fidel/index.html. Since the formal takeover of Raúl 
Castro as head of state, the title of Fidel’s pieces has been changed from “Refl exiones 
del Comandante en Jefe” to “Refl exiones del Compañero Fidel” (Refl ections of 
Comrade Fidel).
16. Cited in Sandschneider (1987: 116).
17. In the North Korean case, Kim Il Song delegated the military high command to his 
son Kim Jong Il well before his death in 1994. Scholars have seen this move as a key 
factor in securing the designated succession from father to son, as from this position 
Kim Jong Il was able to counter challenges from within the armed forces and instead 
to craft an alliance with the military around his person (e.g. Scobell, 2005).
18. For example Turner (2003: 7). When Chávez called in early 2007 to unite all parties 
that supported him in the elections into a single party, the leader of one of the smaller 
parties, Lina Ron of the UPV, reportedly agreed to disband her party with the following 
words, so archetypal of the Weberian category: “My comandante gives the order – we 
obey. Who am I to question the second Liberator of the Republic, the messiah God 
sent to save the people?” (quoted in The Economist, March 8 2007).
19. This image has been explicitly confi rmed by Chávez on numerous occasions, for 
instance when he used his radio show Aló Presidente in February 2007 to tell Fidel: “You 
know that I don’t have any complex about it: I call you ‘father’ in front of the entire 
world.”
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